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Abstract. In an open innovation environment, organizational learning
takes place by means of dispersed teams which expand their knowledge
through collaborative idea generation. Research is often focused on find-
ing ways to extend the set of ideas, while the main problem in our opin-
ion is not the number of ideas that is generated, but a non-optimal set
of ideas accepted during idea selection. When selecting ideas, coalitions
form and their composition may influence the resulting set of accepted
ideas. We expect that computing coalitional strength during idea selec-
tion will help in forming the right teams to have a grand coalition, or
having a better allocation of accepted ideas, or neutralising factors that
adversely influence the decision making process. Based on a literature
survey, this paper proposes the application of the Shapley value and the
nucleolus to compute coalitional strength in order to enhance the group
decision making process during collaborative idea selection.
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1 Introduction
With the increased use of Internet technology, companies are increasingly try-
ing to reduce transactional costs. R&D costs may similarly be reduced by the
adoption of Internet technology, as this fosters the communication in dispersed
working teams and across collaborating companies. Indeed, with the adoption
of these collaboration tools, we are well on the road to open innovation. The
expertise relevant for the design of a new product is not always available within
the boundaries of one team or firm. Hence the idea of open innovation suggests
to create online distributed teams in which people from different companies and
disciplines co-operate on the design of a new product. However, utilising a team’s
full innovation potential poses some serious problems. Most research thus far has
focused on the extension of the set of ideas, and researchers have tried to neu-
tralise potential pitfalls. There are however indicators that dispersed teams do
come up with enough ideas, but just do not select the right ideas. Hence, we
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should take a closer look at enhancing idea selection, rather than looking at
ways to extend the set of ideas during idea generation[1]. Focusing on the idea
selection stage of the creative process and the corresponding coalition formation
may help find ways to optimise the selection process. Besides, people are often
more risk averse when having an idea accepted with a chance of having more
ideas accepted and more risk-seeking when preventing to lose an idea that had
already been accepted. This in turn may lead to the escalation of commitment
by participants. Eventually ideas have to be accepted, and as a result of the
escalation of commitment, we search for an optimal allocation of accepted ideas
among all participants to satisfy each participant, also known as satisficing: this
may lead to the adoption of minimally acceptable solutions. These non-optimal
solutions may also be caused by coalition formation during both idea generation
and idea selection. We will further explain this in this paper.
This paper presents a literature review on the problems dispersed teams cur-
rently face during the idea generation and selection process. Furthermore, it
stresses the use of coalitional strength during the process of idea selection by
presenting a game theoretic approach. In section 2, we will describe economic
and psychological factors that influence collaboration, followed by a game theo-
retic approach meant to overcome problems in idea selection. We will draw our
conclusions in section 3 based on the literature review in section 2. The theo-
retical framework sketched in this paper will be part of a PhD study conducted
within the EU FP7 funded idSpace project. Future research to be conducted in
this context will be described in section 4.
2 Theoretical background
When looking at the incentives for collaboration, we see that collaboration is
a way for people to learn from each other, or to create new things with the
combined knowledge that they have. In corporate environments, teams are cre-
ated to generate innovative solutions or new products. While historically we
see that research and development mainly took place inside the firm, we now
see a tendency towards an increase of inter-firm alliances to support so-called
open innovation[2]. The reasons for alliances between companies involve sharing
risks, obtaining access to new markets and technologies[3], reducing product-to-
market times, and pooling complementary skills[4, 5]. Research and development
departments of these companies tend to use open innovation to introduce new
products faster and at a lower cost. This however requires collaboration and the
corresponding notions of trust, reciprocity and negotiation, as co-operation is
likely to have competitive aspects as well[6].
When firms collaborate through open innovation, we see that they are hin-
dered by a variety of problems. They may experience individual problems re-
garding decision making, such as emotional involvement, exogenous factors[7],
bounded rationality[8] and escalation of commitment[9]. Besides, the collabora-
tion may be subject to group deficiencies, such as social loafing, group think and
group polarisation. The latter two influence the formation of coalitions in open
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innovation teams. Especially in idea generation and selection, we see that people
need additional support for their ideas to have them accepted. Hence, they form
coalitions to stand stronger against other people’s coalitions and ideas. They are
self-interested, however, as one may support other people’s ideas in return for
their support, also known as reciprocity. As a consequence, coalition formation
in idea generation leads to a non-optimal set of accepted ideas. For instance,
in a collaborative idea generation session, when person A is above person B in
the organisation’s hierarchy, person A may be more informed on the company’s
strategy and mission statement. Therefore, person B, who actually has a good
idea, will be likely to accept person A’s ideas, as he knows person A is more
informed. Though, person A may rather be self-interested, and names one of
his own moderate ideas that is not so close to the organisation’s strategy. Thus,
person A names an idea with a lower utility, but person B is willing to form a
coalition under the presumably rational thought that person A is higher informed
and acts accordingly. This example shows that good ideas are often generated in
collaborative idea generation, but due to individual and group deficiencies, the
selection of ideas is disturbed.
In order to overcome the problem of a non-optimal set of accepted ideas, we
need to study the influence of coalition formation on the allocation of accepted
ideas. To compute this, we need to know what the share of each participant
is in the coalition. After doing so, we may propose a division of the coalition’s
payoff. A considerable amount of research has been conducted on the division
of the coalition’s payoff. In formal game theory, there exist mainly two types of
approaches to compute the share of each participant in the coalition and thus
the division of the coalition’s payoff: the Shapley value[10] and the nucleolus[11].
Both these concepts are central to games in coalitional form, also known as
many-person co-operative games. In such games, players may gain profit from
their actions and this profit may be transferred to others as a result of forming
coalitions. This transferrable utility is expressed in the form of side payments
among players. Side payments are a from of sharing profit from mutually benefi-
cial strategies. For instance, consider three companies that decide to co-operate
and share their R&D departments. They find out that it is wiser to shut down
one R&D department to reduce the costs. The revenue will then be accountable
to the two other R&D departments, whereas the third company made the deci-
sion to shut down their R&D department to reduce costs, a decision from which
all three companies benefit. Therefore, the company that shut down its R&D
department will receive a share of the profit made by the other two company’s
R&D departments, the so-called side payment.
To compute the side payment, we need to compute the value of a coalition
with respect to not forming a coalition. The characteristic function v of the game
defines the values of the set of coalitions that may be formed by the players. To
compute the values of the set of coalitions, we first need to define what eligible
coalitions are. For instance, if we have three players, eight different coalitions
may be formed. First, we have the empty coalition denoted by , an empty set
with no players. Second we have the one-person coalitions {1}, {2} and {3}. The
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two-person coalitions are{1,2}, {1,3} and {2,3}. The grand coalition in which
every player participates is called N. The grand coalition is considered to be the
coalition that has the highest payoff, thereby satisfying the common statement
that the sum of the whole is more than the sum of any of its parts.
The Shapley value focuses on the way participants of an n-person co-operative
game view the value of forming a coalition. The so-called players of the game
weigh the value of co-operation against the value of not co-operating. The value
of the game is computed by taking the value of the coalition and subtracting
the value of the sub coalitions, divided by the number of participants in the
coalition. For instance, if the coalition {1,2} has value 4, coalitions {1} has value
2 and coalitions {2} has value 1, then the value of coalition {1,2} is 4 2 1 = 1.
We denote this as constant c{1,2} = v{1,2} v{1} v{2}. Let’s assume that the
following values are given: c{1} = 2 c{2} = 1 c{1,2} = 1 c{1,3} = 3 cN = -2
We can now compute the Shapley value for person 1, which is the sum of the
constant values of each coalition person 1 participates in divided by the number
of participants in the coalition. With the values given above, we compute player
1’s Shapley value φ 1 = c{1} + c{1,2}/2 + c{1,3}/2 cN/3 = 2 + 1/2 + 3/2
2/3 = 3 + 1/3. If we do this for all three players, we have the Shapley value for
the coalition N. The Shapley value may then be used to divide the coalition’s
payoff. In our example, player 1 receives a 3 + 1/3 share of the coalition’s payoff
of for instance 12.
Another way of dividing the coalition’s payoff is the nucleolus. The nucleolus
is an extension of the Shapley value, that is, we try to find the characteristic
function v and the minimal amount of payoff the players would receive if they
co-operate. The payoff vector containing the minimum payoffs is called the im-
putation, which has the form x = (x1, ..., xn). We then ask the participants how
dissatisfied they are with the proposed imputation (that is, the worst division of
payoffs) and try to minimise the maximum dissatisfaction. The payoff computed
by use of the nucleolus may differ from the Shapley value, as we take into account
what the players expect to have. For instance, if a bank goes bankrupt, people
would like to claim their savings. Player A has 2000 euros in his savings account,
player B has 4000 euros in his savings account and player C has 6000 euros in
his savings account. However, the bank has only 7200 euros to divide among the
players. Player C is sure of receiving 1200 euros, as players A and B receive a to-
tal of 6000 euros. Thus v(C) = 1.2. If we do the same for A and B, we find v(A) =
0 and v(B) = 0. Similarly, v(AB) = 1.2, v(AC) = 3.2, v(BC) = 5.2 and v(ABC)
= 7.2. After a series of calculations, the nucleolus v is found to be (1,2.1,4.1),
while the Shapley value is (1.2,2.2,3.8). The division of payoff would then be re-
spectively (1200,2100,4100) versus (1200,2200,3800). The Shapley value and the
nucleolus will thus lead to different payoff distributions. For player B this makes
a difference of 300 euros extra money, while player C will receive 300 euros less.
If we compare this to the pro rata distribution of (1200,2400,3600), we see that
player C, will actually receive 500 euros extra when the nucleolus is used for
payoff distribution.
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If we translate the example given above to idea selection, it is not always the
case that we have an equal distribution of the set of ideas among participants,
based on their individual skills in idea generation. If we compare the outcomes
for the coalitions and the individual payoff when not co-operating, we may see
different distributions of the payoff. For instance, if we base our imputation on
the number of ideas generated during individual idea generation, it may be that
forming a coalition pays off. We expect that this is the reason why people choose
to form coalitions during idea selection.
3 Conclusions
We think that studying coalition formation in open innovation is a sensible
approach, which regrettably has been ignored thus far. We need to pay attention
to the way coalitions are formed during collaborative idea selection and to what
extent this influences the allocation of accepted ideas among the participants.
Based on literature, we see that people often run into a number of problems while
co-operating, such as escalation of commitment, bounded rationality, group think
and group polarisation, which may lead to the formation of coalitions in such a
way that a non-optimal set of ideas are accepted during idea selection. It is shown
that the nucleolus and the Shapley value may lead to different distributions than
the pro rata distribution of ideas. We expect that if we present the participants
with the computations of the nucleolus and Shapley value, they may become
better aware of the group’s potential, thus forming coalitions that are better
suited to optimise the set of accepted ideas. And if such coalitions are not formed,
a moderator may try to put different people together during idea selection to
have the right coalitions formed. However, forming coalitions may not always be
beneficial for all participants, due to the problems we have sketched in this paper.
We may thus choose to try to neutralise the factors that benefit some, but are
detrimental to others. For instance, if a group is polarised, we may add people
that bridge the gap between the groups that represent the poles to prevent a sub
optimal idea from being accepted. If we do so, we may deviate from the original
game theoretical notions of the Shapley value and the nucleolus, as we include
external (social) factors.
4 Future Research
The above overview suggests many avenues for further research on coalition for-
mation in open innovation. These avenues will be investigated in the context
of the EU funded idSpace project, which focuses on tools for distributed, col-
laborative product innovation. The following steps are envisaged. Based on the
literature, we will first define a model that describes the formation of coalitions
in idea selection. This will be followed by a social simulation that will help us
in analysing the resulting set of accepted ideas. After that, we will try to adapt
the model in such a way that we will be able to predict the formation of coali-
tions. The desired result of our final model will be either the optimisation of the
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formation of ’optimal’ coalitions, that the influencing factors of ’sub-optimal’
coalitions will be neutralised, or that the right people will be chosen in advance
of idea generation to eventually have a grand coalition during idea selection.
These findings will be empirically tested and underpinned in suitable contexts
in which open innovation takes place. We will also look into the possibility of
extending our results to contexts in which collaboration takes place which is
not necessarily focused on (open) innovation. A case in point would be so-called
Learning Networks [12], which are online, social networks designed to foster
non-formal learning and knowledge exchange.
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